UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

W.W. Williams Company,
Pliaintiff,

v.

Case No. 2:13-cv-713

Google, Inc., et a/.,

Judge Michael H. Watson

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action for direct trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114,
false designation of origin and passing off under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
contributory trademark infringement, and common law fraud arising from certain
John Does' use of W.W. Williams Company's ("Plaintiff') trademarks ("Marks") to
fraudulently obtain merchandise and Google, Inc's ("Google") refusal to disable
the associated Gmail email accounts used to perpetrate the fraud. Plaintiff seeks
a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Google and the John Does. ECF
No. 3. 1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion.

I. FACTS
Plaintiff previously filed a substantially similar complaint against the same
Defendants and sought emergency injunctive relief. The previous case, Case No.
2: 13-cv-298, was resolved by agreement of the parties, and an agreed order was
entered. The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs second amended complaint
1

Unless otherwise noted, cites are to Case No. 2:13-cv-298.

and/or amended motion for a TRO in the previous case, Case No. 2:13-cv-298,
and! the verified complaint in the case sub judice.

Plaintiff was established in 1913 and is headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.
Plaintiff provides services to trucking companies. the U.S. military, hospitals, data
centers, and state and local governments. Plaintiff services trucks that break
down and sells and services diesel engines, transmissions, refrigeration units,
and power-generation equipment.
John Does are as of yet unknown parties who have attempted to defraud
Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that these John Does are the same John Does named
as Defendants in the prior action. Google is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in California, which, in addition to maintaining a
search engine, provides a service known as Google Apps Service.
Plaintiff owns four federally registered trademarks: W.W. WILLIAMS,
registration number 2816546, registered February 24, 2002; W.W. WILLIAMS
(stylized), registration number 2794417, registered December 16, 2003; and two
symbols, one with registration number 1,166,781, registered August 25, 1981,
and another with registration number 2,773,047, registered October 14, 2003
(collectively, the "Marks"). Compl. 4-5, ECF No.1. In addition, Plaintiff has
owned the domain name wwwilliams.com since May 29, 1997.
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A. Facts Related to Case No. 2:13-cv-298
On about March 5. 2013. John Does registered the domain name
w'Nw.wwwilliamsinc.com through Google Apps. Through Google's partnership
with GoDaddy.com. GoDaddy.com became the registrar of the domain name.
After registering the domain name and establishing email accounts. the John
Does. posing as Plaintiff. established customer accounts and credit terms with
suppliers to induce the suppliers to send them merchandise and bill Plaintiff.
Specifically. on March 13. 2013. someone with the Signature block UCarter
Monte, Purchasing Manager. W.W. Williams" sent a request for prices for
Multigas detectors to Stauffer Glove. using a contact email address of
cmonte@wwwilliamsinc.com. Com pI. Ex. E. ECF No. 1-2. Docket No. 2:13-cv298. Plaintiff does not employ anyone by that name.

On March 20, 2013, a person identifying herself as "Maude Bechard,
Account Payable, W.W. Williams" submitted a credit application form and
company credit profile to Idville seeking a $54,000 line of credit under the name
Maude Bechard or Jesus Bones. The email address was
ap@wwwilliamsinc.com. The application contained Plaintiff's actual financial
account information and credit references. and the copy of the company credit
profile was a copy of actual credit information on Plaintiffs letterhead, displayed
Plaintiff's logo, and listed Plaintiff's actual address. Compl. Ex. F, ECF No. 1-2,
Docket No. 2:13-cv-298. Plaintiff does not employ anyone named Jesus Bones or

Maude Bechard.
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On March 14,2013, a person calling himself "Jesus Bones, Purchasing
Manager, W.W. Williams" emailed a purchase order to SpringTree Media Group
for 106 Shure audio products totaling $21,094.00. The purchase order was on
Plaintiff's actual order form, displayed Plaintiff's name and logo, and listed
Plaintiff's actual address. The "authorized signature" read "Maude Bechard,
Accounts Payable," and the contact information was ap@wwwilliamsinc.com.
The shipping address was: Raul Mendez, 204 Montana AzuL, Anthony, New
Mexico 88021 Tel: (866) 545-0851. Compl. Exh. G, ECF No. 1-3, Docket No.
2:13-cv-298. Plaintiff does not operate a facility at that address and does not
employ anyone named Raul Mendez.
On March 25, 2013, a person identifying himself as Carter Monte emailed
a purchase order to 24 Hr. Safety seeking various pieces of equipment totaling
$42,454.76. The order was on Plaintiff's form, displayed Plaintiff's name and
logo, and listed Plaintiff's address. The "authorized signature" again was Maude
Bechard, and the contact information was listed as ap@wwwilliamsinc.com. The
shipping address was: Malissa Preston, W.W. Williams, 3149 Clarabelle Street,
Columbus, GA 31903 Tel: (866) 545-0851. Com pI. Exh. H, ECF No. 1-3, Docket
No.2: 13-cv-298. Plaintiff does not operate a facility at that address and does not
employ anyone named Malissa Preston.
On April 1, 2013, a person identifying himself as "Mark Csikos" sent an
email fromtheaddressmcsikoswwwilliamsinc.com@gmail.com to
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websales@jendcosafety.com seeking price quotes on MSA Altair Multigas
Detectors. Second Amend. Compl. Ex. I, ECF No. 24-2, Docket No. 2:13-cv-298.
The next day, a person identifying herself as "Davila Javier, Purchasing
Manager, W.W. Williams," sent an email to Brance-Krachy Co., Inc. seeking a
price quote for FLUKE Multimeter products. Id. Ex. J, ECF No. 24-3.
On April 17, 2013, Plaintiff received an invoice from Quest Environmental

& Safety Products, Inc. for $39,129.06 worth of MDA Altair Multigas Detectors
that it did not order or receive . The invoice stated the products were shipped to
"Raul Mendez, W.W. Williams, 4905 SW 152nd Ave., Beaverton, OR 97007."
Gibson Aff., Second Amend. Com pI. Ex. K, ECF No. 24-4, Docket No. 2:13-cv298.
On April 22, 2013, someone at Consignia.ca, an online store which sells
digital video projectors, forwarded Plaintiff's counsel a fraudulent email from
IIJesus Bones, Purchasing Manager, W.W. Williams," using the email address
JBones@wwwilliamsinc.com, seeking a price quote for a digital video projector.

Id. Ex. L, ECF No. 24-5.
Based on the previous facts, Plaintiff initiated the previous suit against
Domains by Proxy and the John Does. Compl., ECF No.1, Docket No. 2:13-cv298. Plaintiff amended the complaint to add Google, TCAST, and Jeffrey Keil,
who turned out to be a victim of identity theft and whose name and credit card
information were used to register the web address through GoDaddy.com.
Amend . Compl., ECF No.9. Although Plaintiff sued Domains by Proxy thinking it
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had control over the domain name, it was actually Go Daddy. com which had the
power to, and did, suspend the domain name www.wwwilliamsinc.com.lt
transferred that domain name to Plaintiff pursuant to the Court's April 19, 2013,
Order. Plaintiff thereafter dismissed Domains by Proxy from the suit.
Plaintiff's second amended complaint was against only Google and the
John Does. Second Amend. Compl., ECF No. 24, Docket No. 2:13-cv-298.
Plaintiff brought a claim against the John Does for direct trademark infringement
under 15 U.S .C. § 1114, a claim against the John Does for false designation of
origin and passing off under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), a claim against the John Does
for common law fraud, and a claim against Google for contributory trademark
infringement.
Plaintiff sought a TRO against the John Does and Googie requiring:
(1) Google to immediately and permanently disable all email accounts hosted on
its servers that include the characters wwwilliamsinc and the Gmail accounts
djavier.wwwilliamsinc.com@gmail.com and
mcsikoswwwilliamsinc.com@gmail.com and an order prohibiting Google from
permitting anyone to use a Gmail address including the characters wwwilliamsinc
or wwwilliamsinc.com@gmail.com in the future; (2) enjoining the Defendants
from infringing or falsely designating the origin of Plaintiff's Marks, using the
Marks in commerce, using Plaintiff's credit information, and injuring Plaintiff's
reputation; (3) enjoining the Defendants from registering, selling, transferring or
assigning any domain name containing the Marks; and (4) enjoining the John
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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Does from using any of Plaintiff's Marks, or names or marks deceptively similar
to Plaintiff's Marks, in connection with a website or as metatags, directory names,
other computer addresses, invisible data, or otherwise engaging in acts or
conduct that would cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or affiliation of
Plaintiff with the defendants. Plaintiff and Google eventually proposed an agreed
order resolving Plaintiff's amended complaint.

B. Facts Related to Current Case
On May 12, 2013, the domain name wwwilliamsincs.com was registered
by John Does through Vistaprint Technologies, Ltd., a hosting service that allows
its customers to set up online businesses anonymously and hosts their domains.
At about the same time, John Does set up the Gmail email account
edouglas.wwwilliamsincs.com@gmail.com through the Google Apps Service.
John Does have used the wwwilliamsincs.com address and corresponding gmail
account to seek price quotes and place orders for products, including
sophisticated satellite cell phones and surveillance equipment, under the name
W.W. Williams.
Specifically, on June 11,2013, a person identifying himself as "Eaton
Douglas, Purchasing Manager, W.W. Williams" sent out an email blast from
edouglas.wwwilliamsincs.com@gmail.com, with the subject line "Thuraya Order"
to several companies, requesting prices on Thuraya SG-2S20 satellite mobile
phones. Gibson Aft., Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1, Docket No. 2:13-cv-713. Recipients
of the emails contacted W.W. Williams to verify Eaton Douglas was an employee
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and out found out he was not. One recipient notified W.W. Williams that Thuraya
phones are for use only in the Middle East; Africa; and Central, East and
Southeast Asia. Id.
On June 12, 2013, a John Doe purporting to be "Eaton Douglas" sent more
emails requesting pricing on Thuraya satellite phones using the email address
edouglas@wwwilliamsincs.com. Gibson Aft., Ex. C, ECF No. 4-1, Docket No.
2:13--cv-713. On June 13,2013, a John Doe purporting to be "Eaton Douglas"
submitted a purchase order via email to Ariana Commerce Corporation of Los
Angeles, California for the purchase of thirty-six Thuraya satellite phones totaling
$34,850.00. The purchase order was on a W.W. Williams form, which displayed
the actual W.W. Williams name and logo and listed W.W. Williams' address on
West Goodale Boulevard in Columbus, Ohio. The contact email listed was
ap@wwwilliamsincs.com. The "ship to" address was to Jennifer Church in
Maine. Gibson Aft., Ex. F, ECF No. 4-2. Docket No. 2:13--cv-713. W.W.
Williams has no facilities at the Maine address, nor does it have an employee
named Jennifer Church.
On June 14, 2013, W.W. Williams contacted Vistaprint to inform it of the
fraudulent use of the domain name wwwilliamsincs.com and the email
addresses. Vistaprint terminated the customer account and allowed W.W.
Williams to initiate a transfer of the domain the same day. The email account
edouglas@wwwilliamsincs.com has been disabled.

Case No. 2:13-cv-713

Page 8 of 25

On June 18, 2013, the John Does obtained the domain
wwwilliamsincss.com through Vistaprint. On July 2, 2013, a John Doe purporting
to be "Eaton Douglas" sent an email using the email address
edouglas@wwwilliamsincss.com to ask for price quotes on various surveillance
and security equipment. Gibson Aff., Ex. G, ECF No. 4-2, Docket No. 2:13-cv713, W.W. Williams contacted Vistaprint and the wwwilliamsincss.com account
was disabled later that day.
However, Google refuses to disable the fraudulent gmail addresses,
including edouglas. wwwilliamsincs.com@gmail .com, directing Plaintiff instead to
make use of Google's spam procedures. This Opinion and Order addresses the
relief sought in Plaintiff's newly filed case and motion for TRO in docket no. 2:13cv-713.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court considers four factors in determining whether to issue a TRO:
(1) whether the movant has established a substantial probability of success on
the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of an injunction; (3) whether an injunction would substantially harm third parties;
and (4) whether an injunction would serve the public interest. Winnett v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010). The factors are not

prerequisites; rather, they must be balanced. Capobianco, D. C. v. Summers,
377 F.3d 559,561 (6th Cir. 2004). For instance, "a strong showing of irreparable
harm, decidedly outweighing harm to the defendant, may justify an injunction
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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even where the movant cannot make a strong showing of likelihood of success
on the merits, as long as the plaintiff can show serious questions going to the
merits of the suit." Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417,
1427 (S.D~ Ohio 1990) (citing Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 759 F.2d
1261,1270 (6th Cir. 1985) and In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229
(6th Cir. 1985)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Probability of Success on the Merits
With respect to the first prong, the Court will first consider Plaintiff's
likelihood of succeeding on the merits on any of its claims against the John Does
and will then turn to a discussion of whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its
contributory trademark infringement claim against Google.

1. John Does
Plaintiff's first claim is for direct trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1114. Section 1114(1 )(a) states, "Any person who shall, without the consent of
the registrant-use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). To recover under § 1114, a Plaintiff must
show: (1) ownership of a valid, protectable trademark; (2) that the John Does
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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used the mark in commerce and without the registrant's consent; and (3) there is
a likelihood of consumer confusion.2 HER, Inc. v. REiMAX First Choice LLC, 468
F. Supp. 2d 964, 978

(S.~.

Ohio 2007).

Plaintiff is likely to show ownership of a valid, protectable trademark as it
has presented registrations of its various Marks. Compl. Ex. A-D, ECF Nos. 1-1,
1-2, Docket No. 2:13-cv-298; see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
Next, Plaintiff argues there is no dispute the John Does are using Plaintiff's
Marks in commerce without Plaintiff's consent. The Court agrees Plaintiff is likely
to show the John Does are using Plaintiff's Marks without its consent-Plaintiff
has presented numerous purchase orders containing the Marks which it alleges
are fraudulent.
However, the Court is not convinced John Does are "using in commerce"
the Marks "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services," as those terms are used in § 1114(1 )(a)
and is therefore not convinced trademark infringement is the proper theory of
liability. 3
Most, if not all, of the trademark infringement cases cited by Plaintiff and
reviewed by the Court involve a plaintiff and defendant who both sell goods.
2 The likelihood of confusion between the two marks is also the test used to determine
whether there has been false designation of origin and passing off under § 1125(a).
Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 542.
3 The Act defines "use in commerce" to mean "bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade . ... " A mark is deemed to be in use in commerce when it is placed on
goods sold and transported in commerce or when it is used or displaced in the sale or
advertising of services rendered in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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Typically, the plaintiff sues the defendant, arguing the defendant is using a mark
so similar to plaintiff's mark that the consuming public will be deceived into
believing either that the defendant is selling plaintiff's bona fide goods or that the
plaintiff sponsors the defendant's goods. Here, Plaintiff has not cited any cases
in which a court has applied the § 1114(1 )(a) analysis in a case of, essentially.
corporate identity theft where a defendant is pretending to be the plaintiff and is
using the plaintiff's marks to buy goods. This case is very different from the
typical trademark infringement cases, even trademark infringement cases
involving the internet, and the Court is not convinced that trademark law applies
to the alleged wrongs. 4
Nonetheless, the Court has not found any cases preventing plaintiffs from
bringing § 1114 claims in similar circumstances, and Plaintiff has at least
presented serious questions as to the merits of its trademark infringement claim.
The Court will therefore apply the eight-part likelihood of confusion test as best it
can to this scenario.
Whether the defendant's use of the disputed mark is likely to cause
confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the
parties, is "[t]he touchstone of liability .... " Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z
Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 2003). "[I]n determining
4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated the goals of the Trademark Act are to protect
the trademark's owner from deprivation of goodwill when an infringer applies the
trademark to his own goods and to protect consumers' ability to distinguish between
goods of competing manufacturers. Inwood, 456 U.S. 844 at 855 n. 14. This case does
not implicate either goal.
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whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the following eight factors should be
considered: (1) strength of plaintiff's mark; (2) relatedness of the goods;
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing of
channels used; (6) degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting
the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion in selecting the mark. Audi AG v.
D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However,
"[e]ach case presents its own complex set of circumstances and not all of these
factors may be particularly helpful in any given case." Interactive Prods. Corp.,
326 F .3d at 694 (internal quotation omitted). Because of the context of the case,
the Court will analyze the likelihood of supplier confusion as opposed to
consumer confusion.
The first factor is a "factual determination of the mark's distinctiveness.
The more distinct a mark, the more likely is the confusion resulting from its
infringement .... " Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 543. There has been no evidence
presented regarding how distinctive Plaintiff's Marks are, and this factor is
therefore neutral.
With respect to the second factor, the Sixth Circuit has held "if the parties
compete directly by offering their goods or services, confusion is likely if the
marks are sufficiently similar." Id. While this factor is relevant in typical
trademark infringement cases, it is not relevant in this case as the John Does are
not offering goods or services that contain Plaintiff's marks.
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In considering the third factor, "courts should examine the pronunciation,
appearance, and verbal translation of conflicting marks." Id. (quotation omitted).
"[W]ith respect to domain names, addition of characters along with the mark does
not eliminate the likelihood of confusion." Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's domain name is "wwwilliams.com," and the disputed
domain names are "wwwilliamsinc.com," "wwwilliamsincs.com," and
"wwwilliamsincss.com." The email addresses used to make the fraudulent orders
also contain the phrase "wwwilliamsinc.com" or "wwwilliams" The portion which
includes Plaintiff's Mark ("wwwilliams") is pronounced the same in both Plaintiff's
domain name and the John Does' domain name. Additionally, the domain
names appear in the same font and in all lower case letters. The addition of
"inc"
, "incs ," or "incss" after "wwwilliams" in the John Does' domain name and
email addresses does not distinguish those names from Plaintiff's domain name
sufficiently to avoid confusion. PAeeAR Inc. v. Telescan Tech. LLe, 319 F.3d
243,252 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding that use of exact
character match in domain name creates likelihood of confusion), overruled in

part, K.P. Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004): Interactive Prods.
Corp., 326 F.3d at 696 (noting that other courts have determined that "use of
another's trademark in one's website domain name violates trademark law

. ... ").
Additionally, on the fraudulent purchase order forms, the John Does are
using Plaintiff's exact trademarked name-"W.W. Williams"-and trademarked
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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symbol of three intertwining stylized Ws enclosed in a circle. See Compl. Ex. OJ, ECF No.1, Docket No. 2:13-cv-298; see also Gibson Aff., Ex. F, ECF No. 42, Docket No. 2:13--cv-713. Thus, the third factor suggests that supplier
confusion is likely.
The fourth factor, evidence of actual confusion, is "the best indicator of
likellhood of confusion," Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 543, and is also met here. Plaintiff
has presented the affidavit of its Corporate Secretary stating that Plaintiff
received an invoice from a supplier for a fraudulent purchase. Gibson Aff.,
Second Amend. Compl., Ex. K, ECF No. 24-4, Docket No. 2:13-cv-298. Receipt
of an invoice indicates the supplier thought Plaintiff made the order. Thus, there
is evidence of actual supplier confusion in this case, and that factor arguably
weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
The fifth factor is not relevant to this case as it considers whether the
customers of the parties' goods or services are similar and whether the parties'
marketing approaches are similar. Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 543.
The sixth factor questions whether consumers would be likely to exercise a
high degree of care when purchasing the defendants' goods. Id. at 544.
Although this factor does not apply directly to this case, it can be analogized as a
determination of whether suppliers would exercise a high degree of care when
filling the John Does' purchase orders. Even though the products the John Does
are ordering are expensive, which would lead one to exercise a high degree of
care, the John Does are using Plaintiff's real business address, business name in
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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the email signature block, real order forms, real financial account information,
and real credit references. Even exercising a high degree of care, suppliers are
likely to be confused.
With respect to the seventh factor, "if the mark was adopted with the intent
of deriving benefit from the reputation of [the plaintiff], that fact alone may be
sufficient to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity." Id. (quotation
omitted). Additionally, "the use of a contested mark with knowledge of the
protected mark at issue can support a finding of intentional copying." PACCAR,
319 F.3d at 254. Here, there is direct evidence of intentional copying of Plaintiff's
Marks, as the John Does are using Plaintiff's exact Marks coupled with its real
business address, credit references, and financial account information. John
Does are using the Marks to capitalize on Plaintiff's business reputation and
obtain free merchandise at the expense of Plaintiff's reputation and good will with
its suppliers. The John Does' use of the Marks is intended to deceive suppliers
into believing the suppliers are dealing with Plaintiff.
The eighth factor, likelihood of expansion of product lines, is inapplicable.
After analyzing these factors, the Court finds that not only is there a
likelihood of confusion, but there is actual confusion. The John Does are using
Plaintiff's actual Marks in the signature lines of the fraudulent emails and in the
John Does' email addresses, leading would-be suppliers to believe the emails
are coming from Plaintiff or Plaintiff's employees. The John Does are further
representing themselves as Plaintiffs employees by using Plaintiff's actual
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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business name and business address in the signature blocks of the emails. The
John Does also used Plaintiff's Marks, in conjunction with Plaintiff's actual
address, trade references, and financial account information, in the credit
application to Idville as well as in the fraudulent purchase orders to SpringTree
Media Group and 24 Hr. Safety. Compl. Exs. E-J, ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3, Docket
No. 2:13-cv-298; see also Gibson Aff., Ex. F, ECF No. 4-2, Docket No. 2:13-cv713 (without financial account information). There is no doubt that the John
Does are purposefully intending to deceive the supplying companies into
believing that the purchase orders are coming from or are made with Plaintiff's
consent.
Accordingly, to the extent a trademark infringement claim applies to this
circumstance, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the claim. As Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on that claim, the Court does not discuss the merits of Plaintiff's fraud
claim.

2. Google
Plaintiff also brings a claim against Google for contributory trademark
infringement. In a more traditional trademark infringement case (a case involving
two sellers of goods), the Supreme Court has stated, "liability for trademark
infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark
of another." Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982). "[I]f
a manufacturer or distributer intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
Case No. 2:13-cv-713

Page 17 of 25

reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit." Id. at 854 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that under this test,
Google is contributorially liable for the John Does' trademark infringement.
Just as Plaintiff has raised serious questions as to the whether John Does
are liable for direct trademark infringement, it has also raised serious questions
as to whether Google can be contributorially liable for such infringement. While

Inwood's test does not neatly apply to Google in this case (as it is neither a
manufacturer or distributor and arguably does not supply a product), courts have
applied Inwood's test outside of the context of manufacturers and distributors and
even when the party supplies a service rather than a product. See e.g. Hard

Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49
(7th Cir. 1992).
The Sixth Circuit, at least two other circuits, and this Court have applied
the contributory infringement doctrine to defendants who were not distributors or
manufacturers when the defendant supplied a product or service to the infringer.

Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2013) (flea market operator
contributorially liable for trademark infringement where he continued to supply
product or service to vendors he knew or had reason to know were engaging in
trademark infringement); Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148-49 (treating
contributory infringement as a species of tort and finding owner of flea market
could be contributorially liable for infringements by its vendors); Fonovis8, Inc. v.
Csse No. 2:13-cv-713
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Cllerry Auction, Inc.. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting the Seventh Circuit's
standard); Habeeba's, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
When applying Inwood to parties who provide a service rather than a
product, the Ninth Circuit has considered the extent and control a defendant
exercises over a third party's means of infringement. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984.
If a defendant exercises direct control and monitors the instrumentality used for
infringement, a court can apply Inwood to defendants who merely supply
services rather than products. Id. Thus, when dealing squarely with services,
the Ninth Circuit applies a modified Inwood standard, requiring a plaintiff to
establish that the defendant "continued to supply its services to one who it knew
or had reason to know was engaging in trademark infringement" and show that
the defendant has "direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a
third party to infringe." Louis Vuitton Mal/etier v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d
936 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984).
j

As presented, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of its claim against Google. Plaintiff has argued that
Google became aware of the alleged fraud and is still permitting the John Does
to utilize its services/products (the email addresses hosted on Google's servers).
Plaintiff argues the John Does would be unable to accomplish their scheme
without the email accounts.
But, that may not be enough. The parties have not briefed whether the
email accounts, which are hosted on Google's servers, should be construed as
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"products" or "services," and as such, the Court is unable to determine whether
the traditional Inwood test should be applied, whether the Ninth Circuit's "service"
test should be applied, or whether some other test should be applied. At least
one case suggests Plaintiff's theory would fall under the "services" test.
Symantec Corp. v. Logical Plus, Inc., No. C 06-7963 51, 2009 WL 3416178, at *8

(N.D. Call Oct. 20, 2009) (finding that provider of email address which defendant
used to sell counterfeit merchandise was supplying service for purposes of
contributory infringement analysis but finding there was no evidence provider
exercised direct control and monitoring of the email addresses).
As noted, under the Ninth Circuit's "services test," Google would be liable
only if Plaintiff can make the additional showing that Google retains direct control
and monitoring of the email accounts John Does are using to perpetrate fraud.
Plaintiff has not presented evidence of Google's ability to monitor or control the
disputed email accounts, but the Court has no reason to doubt counsel's
unsupported argument that Google controls the file servers, Gmail accounts, and
email systems John Does are utilizing.
Accordingly, while the Court cannot find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on
the merits of its claim against Google, it has at least presented serious questions
going to the merits of that claim. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 10607 (2nd Cir. 2010) {holding, without adopting the Ninth Circuit's "control" test, an
internet service provider may be contributorially liable for trademark infringement
if it "continues to supply its service to one whom it knows or has reason to know
Case No. 2:13-cv-713
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is engaging in trademark infringement,"); Cf., e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd.

v. Google,

Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 164 (4th Cir. 2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment

because trier of fact could find Google continued to allow identified infringers to
use its AdWords services). In any subsequent briefing before the preliminary
injunction hearing, however, all parties should specifically discuss what test it
believes applies to each claim at issue and layout the prima facie elements of a
claim under that test.

B. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiff argues the Court should find a presumption of irreparable injury
because it has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion. There is some discussion
among courts as to whether the presumption of harm in trademark cases is
appropriate given the United States Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). CLT Logistics v. River West Brands, 777

F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1072 (E.D. Mich. 2011). The Sixth Circuit has not addressed
whether eBay applies to injunctions in trademark cases. Id.
Even without applying a presumption for irreparable injury, though, the
Court finds this factor strongly weighs in favor of granting the TRO as Plaintiff is
likely to continue to suffer irreparable harm without the requested relief.
According to the Court's July 19, 2013 hearing, John Does were placing
fraudulent purchase orders as late as that afternoon. There is no indication John
Does have ceased attempting to make fraudulent purchase orders in Plaintiff's
name. As long as John Does have the ability to send fraudulent emails, there is
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potential for future harm, and there is therefore no adequate remedy at law. Cf.
Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 550. It appears the way to stop the fraud is to disable the

email accounts that the John Does are using to perpetrate the fraud.
Furthermore, John Does' unauthorized use of Plaintiff's Marks could
irreparably harm Plaintiff's good name and reputation if Plaintiff fails to pay
suppliers for the fraudulently ordered supplies. It could make suppliers hesitant
to work with Plaintiff in the future. Additionally, the intended use of the
purchased products is unknown, but counsel has represented that many of the
products ordered are banned outside of the United States and that the John
Does are seeking satellite phones usable only in the Middle East, Africa, and
Central, East and Southeast Asia, as well as surveillance equipment. Therefore,
Plaintiff's reputation could be harmed if its name becomes linked to a nefarious
use of the ordered products. For all these reasons, the irreparable harm factor
weighs strongly in favor of granting a TRO.

C. Harm to Third Parties
The only entities who may be harmed by the TRO are the John Doe
defendants. John Does are the alleged infringers who are attempting to defraud
various supplying companies, and the Court does not consider the harm to John
Does. See Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 550 ("[defendant] faces no hardship in
refraining from willful trademark infringement .... "); Worthington Foods, 732 F.
Supp. at 1461 ("harm caused to apparent infringers, however, is not entitled to
consideration in assessing the harm caused by an injunction.").
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In fact, the third party potential suppliers whom the John Does are
targ.eting would be helped by a TRO, as the TRO could assist in preventing the
John Does from making additional fraudulent purchase requests. Thus, this
factor weighs in favor of granting the TRO.

D. Public Interest
As a TRO could help avoid the ongoing confusion and fraud in the
marketplace, the public interest favors a TRO in this case. Cf. Audi AG, 469 F.3d
at 550; Worthington Foods, 732 F. Supp. at 1463. Moreover, the public has an
interest in preventing the illegal purchase of prohibited items.

E. Bond
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 states "[t]he court may issue a
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives
security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and
damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Despite the mandatory language of the rule,
the Court has discretion to determine an appropriate amount of, or even waive,
bond. USAGO Goal Go. v. Garbo min Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94,100 (6th Cir.
1982).
The purpose of bond is to protect the party injured from damage
occasioned by the injunction. Id. Neither the John Does nor Google will be
injured by this TRO, and the Court therefore requires a nominal bond in the
amount of $1 O.
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F. Scope of Injunction
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), Google, its officers,
agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other persons in active
concert or participation with Google and the John Does, their agents, servant,
employees, assigns, representatives and successors and all people in active
concert with them, are ORDERED
•

To immediately and permanently disable all email accounts hosted on
Google's servers that include the characters "wwwilliam" or
"wwwilliamsincs" or "wwwilliamsincss," in that order, including but not
limited to the Gmail accounts
edouglas.wwwilliamsincs.com@gmail.com and
edouglas.wwwilliamsincss.com@gmail.com, and not in the future permit
anyone to utilize a gmail system email address that includes the
characters "wwwilliam" in that order,
• To stop infringing or falsely designating the origin of the W.W. Williams
Marks, as defined in the Verified Complaint, from using the W.W.
Williams Marks in commerce in any way, from using W.W. Williams
credit information in any way, and from injuring W.W. Williams'
reputation,
• Stop using any of the W.W. Williams Marks or names or marks
deceptively similar to the W.W. Williams Marks in connection with a
website or as metatags, directory names, other computer addresses,
invisible data, or otherwise engaging in acts or conduct that would
cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or affiliation of W.W.
Williams with Defendants.
Pursuant to Rule 65( d)(2), the Order is binding only on those who receive
actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
This Order is issued on this day July 22, 2013 at 4:45 p.m. It was entered
without notice to the John Doe defendants because they have not been
identified. It memorializes an oral order granted July 19, 2013 at approximately
3:45 p.m. without notice to Google because the facts in Janet Gibson's affidavit
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and Plaintiff's verified complaint show Plaintiff is likely to suffer immediate and
irreparable injury before Google can be heard in opposition. The Order will
expire FOURTEEN DAYS from the date of entry unless Google consents to a
longer extension or the Court extends it for a like period of time for good cause.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). The parties should contact the Court with proposed
times for a preliminary injunction hearing.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Plaintiff has not necessarily shown a strong likelihood of success
on the merits, as the Court is not yet convinced this case is properly brought as a
trademark infringement case under § 1114(1 )(a), Plaintiff has raised serious
questions as to whether § 1114(1 )(a) is applicable. If applicable, Plaintiff has
moreover raised serious questions as to Google's liability for contributory
trademark infringement. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown irreparable harm, that a
TRO would not harm John Does or Google, and that a TRO would be in the
public interest. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the TRO as stated above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

M HAEL H. WAtSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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